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In this paper, we assess the impact of the easing of vehicle exemption limits and asset 
restrictions after the passage of welfare reform legislation on the rates of car-ownership 
observed among female headed households with children.  Prior to the passage of the 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) in 1996, 
nearly all states exempted only $1,500 of vehicle equity from the minimum assets test 
and assets were limited to $1000 in most states.  Post-welfare reform, however, nearly all 
states increased the vehicle exemption limit, with twenty-five states exempting the entire 
value of a single vehicle.  In addition, the overall asset test rose in most states.  In this 
paper, we use micro-level data from the 1993 and 1996 panels of the Survey of Income 
and Program Participation (SIPP) from the years 1994 to 1999 to examine 1) how 
changes in state-level welfare rules over this time period affected auto ownership rates 
among those most likely at risk of receiving welfare and 2) how the resulting change in 
auto ownership rates affected the probability of being employed for these individuals.  To 
identify the effect of the redefined benefit eligibility rules on auto-ownership rates, we 
exploit inter-state differences and changes over time in welfare eligibility rules.  Once we 
control for individual level demographics and state-level economic conditions, our results 
suggest that the probability of owning a car is greater for those who reside in states with 
higher overall asset limits and in states with exemptions for multiple vehicles.  When we 
look at the sample of female heads with children relative to a control group of male and 
female household heads without children, we also find that assessing the value of the 
vehicle on an equity basis (rather than fair market basis) is associated with higher rates of 
car ownership.  Using a two stage least squares approach (2SLS) that instruments car 
ownership with benefit eligibility rules, we find some evidence that asset-related rules 
have an effect on employment outcomes via car ownership.  Thus, our results shed light 
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I. Introduction  
Having access to a car is an important determinant of labor market outcomes and 
researchers have found strong positive effects of auto-ownership on the probability of 
employment, the number of hours worked, and earnings (Raphael and Rice 2002, Ong 
2002, Holzer et al 1994).  Not only does owning a car potentially reduce one’s commute 
time, but access to private transportation also allows one to search in a wider geographic 
area, which increases the probability of receiving a desirable job offer.   
Over the past three decades, household access to automobiles in the United States 
has increased considerably.  Between 1969 and 1995, the average numbers of 
automobiles per households doubled from one to two.  Moreover, this increase coincided 
with a 17 percent reduction in household size.  Over the same time period, the number of 
households with zero vehicles declined from 13 million (21 percent of the 1969 
household population) to 8 million (8 percent of the 1995 household population).  Hence, 
near the end of the century, household access to automobiles in the United States was 
nearly universal (U.S. Department of Transportation, 1999). 
These aggregate figures, however, mask sharp differences in auto ownership 
across households of different income levels and different racial and ethnic groups.  For 
example, approximately 18 of households earning less than $25,000 did not own a motor 
vehicle in 1995 compared to 4 percent of those with earnings between $25,000 and 
$55,000 and 1 percent for those households earning above $55,000 (Hu and Young 
1999).  Concerning race and ethnicity, 24 percent of black households and 12 percent of 
Latino households did not own a single car in 1995 compared to only 5.4 percent of white 
households.   3
While these difference in auto-ownership rates likely reflect differences in 
household income and differences in access to credit markets, the relatively low car-
ownership rates of poor and/or minority households may be determined in part by the 
minimum-assets tests that one needed to meet in order to qualify for cash assistance 
under the old Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program.   Prior to 
welfare reform in 1996 nearly all states exempted only $1,500 of vehicle equity from the 
minimum assets tests and most states typically limited assets to $1000 in order to receive 
welfare benefits or Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).  These asset limits 
created disincentives to save and may have discouraged ownership of a reliable vehicle, 
which, in turn, may have slowed the transition from welfare to work for AFDC 
recipients.  With the passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) in 1996, states were given the flexibility to specify the 
welfare eligibility rules to best meet their residents’ needs.  As a result, almost all states 
raised their asset limit and vehicle equity exemption levels above the prior national limits 
when establishing welfare eligibility for the new Temporary Assistance to Needy 
Families (TANF) program (Department of Health and Human Services 2002). 
In this paper, we assess the impact of the easing of vehicle exemptions and asset 
limits on the rates of car-ownership observed among female-headed households with 
children who are likely to be at risk of receiving TANF/AFDC cash assistance.  The 
varied response among states in the timing and size of the easing of asset restrictions 
allows us to identify how variation in welfare rules impacts the likelihood of car 
ownership and ultimately shapes labor market outcomes such as employment status, 
hours worked, and hourly wages.     4
Using micro-level data from the 1993 and 1996 panels of the Survey of Income 
and Program Participation (SIPP) from 1994 to 1999 that is matched to state-level 
welfare rules from the Urban Institute, our results suggest that the probability of owning a 
car is greater for those who reside in states with higher overall asset limits and in states 
with exemptions for multiple vehicles.  When we look at the sample of female heads with 
children relative to a control group of male and female household heads without children, 
we also find that assessing the value of a vehicle on an equity basis (rather than fair 
market basis) is associated with higher rates of car ownership.  Using a two stage least 
squares approach (2SLS) that instruments car ownership with benefit eligibility rules, we 
find some evidence of a causal link between car ownership and employment outcomes 
for female household heads with children.  Thus, our results suggest that public policy 
that encourages car-ownership should be an integral component of programs intended to 
move welfare recipients into sustainable employment.   
II.  Background:  Welfare Reform, Car Ownership, and Employment 
 
Why do Cars Matter?  Theory and Empirical Evidence 
 
Both theory and empirical evidence suggest that owning a vehicle has a direct and 
positive effect on employment outcomes.  In theory, car ownership may have an effect on 
employment by potentially reducing commute times.  If commute times are lower, the 
reduction in the fixed cost of working will free up time for alternative uses.  As a result, 
labor supply theory predicts access to private transportation can result in more hours 
worked (if an individual is already employed) or an increase labor market participation (if 
he/she is not already in the labor force).   
  Figure 1 (panel A) demonstrates the effect commute time has on work hours for   5
an individual who is already employed using a simple model of labor supply.  A person’s 
decision about how many hours to supply to the labor market (the labor vs. non-labor 
decision) is constrained by time, shown by point “A” as the total time endowed.  Workers 
convert non-market time into income by supplying labor time at a given wage.  However, 
time spent commuting is not compensated, which results in flat portion of the budget 
constraint along the x-axis.    
Ownership of an automobile would reduce commute time which causes the 
budget constraint to shift outward (a shift of the budget constraint from ADE to ABC).  
This shift is equivalent to an income effect or an increase in income.  If we assume that 
both free time and market goods (purchased with disposable income) are normal goods, 
then a decrease in commute time will result in an increase in both free time (H
1 to H
0) 
and disposable income (from I
1 to I
0).  The latter implies an increase in work hours.   
  Figure 1 (Panel B) depicts individuals with a stronger preference toward non-
market time and demonstrates that car access may affect the labor force participation 
decision.  For a person with steep indifference curves, a rightward shift in the budget 
constraint due to the decrease in commute time may actually pull this person into the 
labor market.  Under the old budget constraint (ADE), the individual was maximizing her 
utility by not working.  However, under the new budget constraint (ABC), this individual 
will supply hours to the labor market.  This is shown by the tangency of the indifference 
curve corresponding to utility level (U
0) to the budget constraint ABC. 
Empirically, a number of papers have documented a connection between vehicle 
access and labor market outcomes.  Several papers with a specific focus on welfare 
recipients, have made a link between car ownership and employment.  For example, in a   6
study of welfare recipients in Michigan, Danziger et al. (1999) discovered that the lack of 
a car or a driver’s license was cited as the most common problem among 15 possible 
barriers to employment that were listed in the survey.  In a related vein, using a sample of 
California welfare recipients, Ong (1996) found car ownership to be positively and 
significantly linked to the likelihood of employment, hours worked, and monthly 
earnings.  Lucas and Nicholson (2002) evaluated the Good News Garage program in 
Vermont (which sells donated vehicles to individuals with income less than 150 percent 
of the poverty level), and the authors conclude that receipt of a vehicle through the 
program results in a statistically significant increase in both the probability of 
employment and in earned income.
1   
In more recent work on auto ownership and employment, papers have attempted 
to identify the causal portion of the relationship between car access and employment 
outcomes.  These papers take into consideration the possibility of reverse causality 
between vehicle access and jobs or, in other words, that this relationship may run from 
labor market outcomes towards car ownership.
2  Both Raphael and Rice (2002) and Ong 
(2002) have used instrumental variables in an effort to isolate the actual effect of vehicle 
ownership on employment outcomes.  Raphael and Rice (2002) used state-level variation 
in gasoline taxes and car insurance costs to instrument for car ownership, and the results 
indicate positive effects of car ownership on the probability of employment and hours 
worked, significant at the five percent level.  Ong (2002) used insurance premiums and 
                                                 
1 In a paper that studied black and white male youths rather than welfare recipients, Holzer, Ilhanfeldt and 
Sjoquist (1994) demonstrated a positive association between vehicle access and wages, and a negative 
association with the duration of unemployment.   
2 In addition, both car ownership and employment outcomes could be driven by an unobservable 
characteristic such as motivation.  If car ownership is correlated with unobserved ability, then omitted 
variables will create biased estimates of the effects of owning a vehicle.   7
population density to instrument for car ownership and find that auto ownership increases 
the odds of being employed by 9 percentage points. 
Another approach to identifying the causal portion of the relationship between car 
access and employment outcomes is to use repeated observations on the same person or 
household over time (longitudinal data), in order to investigate the effect of having a car 
in an earlier period on employment status and welfare participation in a later period.  
Cervero, Sandoval, and Landis (2002) used this approach with a sample of welfare 
recipients from Alameda County in California.  The authors conclude that car ownership 
significantly increased the odds of transitioning into employment and off of public 
assistance.  Bruce and Richards (2003) arrive at similar results using a sample of 
Tennessee welfare recipients.  They find that having access to a vehicle at the time of the 
first wave of the survey decreases the likelihood of being unemployed and on welfare in 
the later wave.  In addition, having access to a car appears to have a positive, significant 
effect on the number of hours worked.  Taken together, the literature points to a causal 
relationship from auto access or ownership towards higher likelihood of employment and 
more work hours.
3  
Turning to a preview of our empirical analysis, an examination of the means 
presented in Table 1 suggests a positive relationship between auto ownership and labor 
market outcomes.  Using data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation 
(SIPP), Table 1 presents differences in employment outcomes between those who own 
cars and those who do not for a sample of female heads of households with children and 
without a college degree.  (The SIPP data is described in detail in the data and methods 
section below.)  We calculate hours and earnings for both the entire sample and for 
                                                 
3 Research has found little evidence of an effect on wages (Raphael and Rice 2002).   8
employed individuals only.  The positive association between car ownership and labor 
market outcomes provides some support of the theoretical predictions shown in Figure 1 
(panels A and B).  It should be noted, however, that these differences are likely upward 
bounds on the effects of car ownership since the causality from car ownership to 
employment and hours may also run the other direction.  For example, having a steady 
job may make one more likely to save, develop credit, and be able to purchase a car.  
Thus, the results presented in Table 1 do not show the causal effects of car ownership and 
are merely suggestive evidence of the effects of access to vehicles.  (Later in the paper, 
we address this concern by treating the changes in welfare rules as exogenous and 
estimate a 2SLS model of car ownership on employment outcomes, as shown in Table 6.  
In addition, in Table 6 we control for other factors such as differences in individual 
characteristics (demographic and human capital) and differences in economic conditions.)   
In Table 1, there are large, statistically significant differences in all labor market 
outcomes (employment, hours, wages, and monthly income) for those with cars 
compared to those without.  Concerning employment rates, there is a forty percentage 
point difference between individuals with cars (81 percent employed) and those without 
(41 percent employed).  For hours worked, those with a car work almost 17 hours more 
per week than those who do not, largely reflecting the differences in employment rates.  
However, limiting our focus to those with jobs, we still find that weekly hours for those 
with cars are still noticeably above (almost 6 hours) those without vehicles.  
Turning to differences in hourly wages and monthly earnings, the differential 
remains sizable between those with and without vehicles.  For those who are employed, 
real hourly wages (in constant 1999 dollars) are $2.50 more for those with vehicles and   9
monthly income is about $600 more.  If we also take into account the increase in earnings 
due to the higher employment rates and hours worked for those with vehicles, we then 
find that those with vehicles earn over three dollars more per hour and earn almost $900 
more per month.  Thus, car ownership appears to be highly correlated with favorable 
labor market outcomes, although the means cannot tell us about the causality behind this 
correlation.  In the next section, we consider the role of asset tests and welfare reform on 
car ownership. 
Welfare Reform and Asset Limits 
 
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
(PRWORA) of 1996 terminated cash welfare transfers as an entitlement (under AFDC).  
The new work-based program, Temporary Aid for Needy Families (TANF), gave funding 
to states as a block grant and allowed states to determine, to a large degree, their program 
rules.  Due to the means-tested eligibility determination of both AFDC and TANF, cash 
assistance is granted only to those whose income and assets are below a specified level. 
Under AFDC, families receiving assistance were not allowed to accumulate more 
than $1000 in countable assets.  This limit excluded the value of certain assets, such as 
housing equity and the value of a vehicle up to $1500.  Under waivers to AFDC granted 
between 1992 and 1996, some states, typically select counties within states, began to 
increase their asset limits and the value of a vehicle exemption as part of welfare 
“demonstrations”.  After PRWORA, states had complete flexibility to set their own asset 
rules and continued to relax asset limits and vehicle exemptions statewide in an attempt 
to stimulate savings (Gallagher 1998, Hurst and Ziliak 2004). 
4   
                                                 
4 For example, in Oklahoma, applicants and recipients must have countable assets below $1,000.  For 
applicants and recipients who own a car, the equity value of a car above $5,000 is treated as a countable   10
Table 2 presents trends in program parameters regarding asset limits from 1993 to 
1999.  These data were compiled 1) from the Urban Institute Welfare Rules Database (for 
the years 1996 to 1999), 2) from unpublished Urban Institute tables for auto exemptions 
from 1993 to 1995, and 3) from the Trim3 Microsimulation model database of historical 
program rules from the Urban Institute for asset limits in 1993 to 1995.  Only the 
majority rules -- the rules in effect for the majority of a caseload for a majority of the year 
-- are presented.  As can be seen in Table 2, there is considerable variation in these rules 
over time and across states and we exploit this variation in our empirical work later in 
this paper. 
Overall, asset limits and vehicle exemptions increased over the period from 1994 
to 1999.  According to our calculations, the average state asset limit (in nominal dollars) 
more than doubled from approximately $1100 in 1994 to $2400 in 1999.  For auto 
exemptions, the average exemption was $1500 in 1994.  By 1999, (for those states with 
auto exemption limits) the average exemption had risen to $6500.  The share of states 
exempting an entire vehicle also jumped dramatically over this period.  By 1999, almost 
half of all states (including the District of Columbia) exempted the value of an entire 
vehicle.   
States also eased their asset tests by exempting all or part of multiple vehicles 
when computing a household’s countable assets.  Therefore, we developed a measure, 
“multiple vehicles”, to take into account the possibility that states exempted the entire 
value of multiple vehicles, exempted a certain dollar value from multiple vehicles, or did 
a combination of the two.  An example of this latter case would be to exempt a vehicle if 
                                                                                                                                                 
asset. The entire equity value of additional cars is counted as an asset. 
(http://www.spdp.org/compstates/okfinan.pdf) 
   11
it is used for income-producing purposes and then to apply the dollar exemption to a 
second vehicle.  As can be seen in the third column, the number of states exempting all or 
a portion of multiple vehicles rose from zero to over a third by 1999.  This is, therefore, 
another dimension along which states could relax their asset tests and vehicle limits. 
Lastly, states could decide how to value the vehicle in the countable asset 
calculation.  States could either assess the vehicle in terms of equity value or fair market 
value.  The equity value is defined as the fair market value minus the amount still owed 
on the vehicle.  For those who purchase a vehicle with an auto loan, the equity value will 
be less than the fair market value and these individuals would be more likely to qualify 
for TANF if their vehicle were assessed in terms of equity.  For those who paid in full, 
the fair market value will be the same as the equity value and they will be indifferent 
between the two valuation options.  As of 1994, all vehicles were assessed in terms of 
their equity value.  By 1999, however, over one quarter of states had switched to the fair 
market value as a method to compute the value of a vehicle. 
Asset Limits, Savings and Auto Ownership:  Theory and Empirical Evidence 
Asset limits, while aiming to target welfare benefits at the most disadvantaged 
group, provide disincentives to save and to own a vehicle.  As shown in Table 2, most 
states have eased their limits on overall assets and increased the amount of the vehicle 
exemption.  Exempting the entire value of an automobile, increasing the dollar amount of 
the vehicle equity exemption, and/or increasing the overall liquid asset limit, would allow 
individuals to increase their vehicle assets and still qualify for welfare benefits.  If the 
individual was without an automobile prior to the relaxation of restrictions, the easing of 
asset limits may provide an adequate incentive for the individual to purchase a vehicle.  If   12
the individual already had a vehicle, he/she may be able to buy a more expensive and 
more reliable vehicle and still qualify for benefits. 
The following example demonstrates the effect of easing the vehicle exemption 
limit.  To begin, assume a state has a total asset limit of $1,000 and a vehicle exemption 
limit of $1,500.  If person A has $200 in liquid assets and a $2,000 car, her total assets 
sum to $700 and she qualifies for assistance.  However, if person B has $600 saved in 
liquid assets and she purchases a $2,000 car, her total assets will sum to $1,100 and she 
will not receive assistance.  Thus, person B may opt not to purchase a vehicle.  If the state 
now exempts the value of a vehicle, person B would be able to purchase the vehicle and 
still remain eligible for benefits.  
Two papers present theoretical predictions of the disincentives to save created by 
asset limits for households who participate in transfer programs.  In Hubbard, Skinner, 
and Zeldes (1995), the authors conclude based on economic theory that "programs with 
asset-based means testing can discourage saving by households with low expected 
lifetime income.”  The implicit tax rate on savings and wealth in this context is extremely 
high.  Powers (1998) develops a graphical depiction of the effects of asset tests on 
savings.  In a two-period consumption model, Powers demonstrates how savings from 
period 1 can reduce the welfare benefit or preclude participation altogether.  Thus, theory 
predicts that asset tests can discourage saving for lower-income families.   
Empirical research in this area is not extensive and studies of the effect of asset 
tests on liquid assets (savings) and vehicle equity (car ownership) have found mixed 
results.  While Powers (1998) found evidence that savings fell by $0.25 for every $1 
decrease in the asset limit under OBRA 81, Hurst and Ziliak (2004) did not find any   13
impact of easing asset limits under PRWORA on savings of at-risk households.   
Two studies have looked directly at the effect of asset limits on vehicle equity and 
ownership (Hurst and Ziliak 2004, Sullivan 2002).  In Hurst and Ziliak (2004), the 
authors use the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to conduct a pre-post analysis of 
changes in net worth, liquid assets, and asset ownership (including cars and checking 
accounts) between 1994 and 2001 resulting from changes in asset limits.  They find that 
the change in vehicle ownership for individuals is positively correlated with the size of 
the increase in the overall asset limit.  However, there was no effect of a vehicle 
exemption or a change in the dollar amount exempted on the change in vehicle equity. 
Sullivan (2002) looks at the change in auto ownership under two policy changes.  
He examines the standardization of vehicle equity restrictions to $1500 under OBRA 81 
(1980-1984) and the loosening of asset tests during the PRWORA waiver period (1993 to 
1996).  Sullivan finds no effects of changes in asset tests and vehicle exemptions on 
vehicle ownership in the earlier period (period surrounding the passage of OBRA 81), but 
does find evidence that the trend towards increasing vehicle exemptions in the 1990s 
resulted in greater holdings of vehicle assets for single mothers with no more than a high 
school degree.  Regarding asset limits and car ownership, Sullivan finds a negative 
relationship (or the opposite result of Hurst and Ziliak (2004)) which implies that car 
ownership is lower in states with larger overall asset limits.   
III.  Empirical Methodology and Data Description 
In this paper, we use data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation 
from 1994 to 1999 to examine the effects of the changes in asset tests on vehicle 
ownership and then look at the potential secondary effects on employment outcomes.    14
The SIPP provides us with a large, national, representative sample with detailed 
demographic, human capital, and program participation data, in addition to valuable 
information on car ownership.  We match a rich set of state-level welfare rules from the 
Urban Institute to our individual-level data and exploit the variation in the asset test 
eligibility criteria across states and over time to examine the potential effects of asset 
limit rules on car ownership. 
To control for the coincident economic expansion, we add state unemployment 
rates in addition to dummy variables for the years in our sample.  As a robustness check, 
we also examine results for our sample (female household heads with children) relative to 
a control group (of men and women without children) to rule out the possibility of 
spurious correlations between welfare rules and car ownership (similar to Hurst and 
Ziliak (2004) and Powers (1998)).  After estimating the effects of welfare rules on car 
ownership, we then use these welfare rules as instruments of car ownership in our 
employment outcome regressions.  To our knowledge, no paper has linked the effects of 
asset-related rules on employment outcomes via car ownership.  
Determinants of Auto Ownership 
We first investigate the effect of welfare rules on auto-ownership using a linear 











0  (1) 
where i=(1,..,N) indexes individuals, k represents the state, Carik is a dummy variable 
equal to one if woman i in state k owns a car; Xik is a vector of individual-specific control 
variables; and α0,γ, and θj are parameters to be estimated.  Specifically,   15
WelfareAssetRulek is a Jx1 vector of asset limit variables and WelfareAssetRulek
j is an 
element in this vector.  These welfare rules vary by state and over time and are merged 
with individual level data by year and the individual’s state of residence. 
  For welfare rules, we consider the following variables.  We include a vehicle 
exemption limit dummy variable to pick up the effect of policies which allow a certain 
amount of the vehicle value to be exempt relative to those states that exempt the entire 
value of the vehicle.  We would expect the sign on the coefficient to be negative, since 
exempting the entire vehicle value is a more lenient policy.  We also include the dollar 
amount of vehicle exempted, if there is limited exemption allowance, and we predict the 
coefficient on this variable to be positive, i.e., that an individual is more likely to have a 
car in a state with more generous vehicle exemptions.  Similarly we include the overall 
asset limit, a dummy variable for multiple vehicles, and a dummy variable for equity 
valuation of the vehicle (rather than fair market value).  The expected signs on these 
variables are also positive.  Lastly, we include a waiver dummy variable that equals one 
if a state ever had a waiver in place.  While waivers typically resulted in looser asset 
limits, many waivers also introduced time limits and work requirements.  Therefore, it is 
unclear whether having a waiver, as the variable is currently defined, is a proxy for 
stricter or more lenient state-level welfare policies.
5  
As a further robustness check, we also look at the effects of welfare reform on 
female heads of households with children relative to a control group that should not 
directly be affected by the asset limits.   
                                                 
5 In the future, we plan to categorize the type of waiver, or how the waiver was used, to allow us to better 
control for other changes in welfare policies such as the introduction of time limits and work requirements 
(ttp://aspe.os.dhhs.gov/hsp/Waiver-Policies99/Table_B.htm).   16
Using a strategy similar to Hurst and Ziliak (2004) and Powers (1998), we use 
male household heads and female household heads without children as a control group 















   Here the base welfare asset rule effects given by the coefficients,θj, capture inter-
state differences in car ownership for our control group (men and women without 
children) that are correlated with the adoption of specific policies.  FemalewithKids is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the observation is for a female household head with 
children.  The coefficients on the interaction terms, κj, gauge the extent to which car 
ownership for female household heads with children (those likely to be affected by 
welfare rules) in state k with policy effort j differs from that of our control group, holding 
constant all other policies implemented by the state.  These coefficients on the interaction 
terms can be therefore be interpreted as the asset-rules effects on auto ownership. 
Determinants of Employment Outcomes:  2SLS 
 
After examining the effects of welfare reform on auto-ownership, we then 
investigate the effect of car ownership on three employment outcomes: the probability of 
being employed, weekly work hours, and hourly wages conditional on being employed.  
To identify the causal effects of car ownership, we employ state-level welfare rules as 
instruments for car ownership. Using variation in these state-rules across states and over 
time, we estimate the two-stage model 
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where i indexes individuals and k indexes states; Employment Outcomeik is one of the 
three outcomes analyzed; Xik is a vector of demographic and human capital variables; 
Carik is a dummy variable indicating a car owner; WelfareAssetRulesk is a state-level 
welfare rule in place in state k; β, γ , δ α, and θ, are parameters; and εik and ηik are error 
terms. 
  Thus, in this framework, we use welfare asset rules as instrumental variables that 
may jointly determine car ownership but which we assume are not correlated with 
employment outcomes except through their effect on car ownership.  More specifically, 
to be valid instruments, these variables need to be correlated with Carij, but not with ηij..  
One concern is that the economic condition of states may in part determine the leniency 
of the welfare rules.  To address this potential problem, we include state unemployment 
rates in our specification.   
Another concern is that the welfare rules that we include in the model of car 
ownership may be correlated with the second stage employment outcome residuals, 
counter to our assumption.  In particular, having a waiver in a state may be an indicator 
that a state was pro-active in helping its recipients move from welfare to work and thus 
there may be a direct link between waivers and employment outcomes.  For this reason, 
we do not include the waiver variable in our set of instruments.
6 
Data 
The data for this project are drawn from several sources. Microdata on car 
ownership, employment outcomes, and basic demographic and human capital 
characteristics come from the 4
th wave of the 1993 panel and the 3
rd , 6
th , 9
th , and 12
th 
                                                 
6 In the future as an alternative empirical strategy, we plan to use the longitudinal aspect of our data to 
analyze whether those who acquire cars in states with looser asset limits are then more likely to obtain a 
job.   18
waves of the 1996 Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) which correspond 
to the year-end of 1994, 1996, 1997, 1998, and 1999.  These surveys provide large 
nationally representative samples of individuals. The topical modules of these waves of 
the SIPP collect information on up to three cars per household and also provide a person 
identifier associated with each vehicle within the household which we use to explicitly 
identify individuals that own a car. 
Data on state-level welfare program rules are assembled by the Urban Institute in 
various forms.  We compiled welfare rules data from the Urban Institute Welfare Rules 
Database (for the years 1996 to 1999), from unpublished Urban Institute tables for auto 
exemptions from 1993 to 1995, and from the Trim3 microsimulation model database of 
the Urban Institute for asset limits in 1993 to 1995.   Data on state unemployment rates 
are constructed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  Specifically, we use seasonally 
adjusted unemployment rates from December to correspond with the year-end data 
collected in the SIPP. 
To focus on the group most at risk of receiving welfare, we choose a similar 
selection strategy to that of Powers (1998) and Hurst and Ziliak (2004).  We limit our 
sample to female household heads without a college degree and with children under the 
age of 18.  Since the state of Ohio eliminated an asset test altogether, we delete female 
heads residing in Ohio from the analysis.  After taking into account these sample 
restrictions, our analysis is based on close to 15,000 observations.  In the analysis using a 
control group, we selected male and female household heads without children and 
without college degrees:  this yields a sample size of about 43,000 for this section of the 
analysis.  For the hours dependent variable in our two-stage least squares specification,   19
women who are not employed are assigned a value of 0.  In our wage models, we further 
restrict the sample to wage and salary workers with complete information.  Lastly, we use 
sample person weights provided in the SIPP for all of our analyses.  The unweighted 
results do not differ qualitatively from those presented in our analysis and are available 
upon request from the authors. 
Summary Statistics 
  Table 3 presents descriptive statistics (stratified by asset rules) for those female 
heads of household most likely at risk of receiving welfare – those with children and 
without a college degree.  To begin, the first column shows mean characteristics of the 
overall sample.  For this group of women, just under 50 percent own their own car.  In 
terms of employment, 60 percent are employed, averaging 35 hours a week and earning 
approximately $9.38, if employed.  Over 35 percent are black, 17 percent are Hispanic, 
20 percent are in school and almost 65 percent have at least a high school degree.  The 
average age of our sample is almost 33 years old and the average number of children 
under the age of 18 is 1.94. Approximately 17 percent are current welfare recipients. 
  Turning to patterns by welfare rules, some clear trends appear.  First, as one 
moves from the least generous vehicle exemption ($1500) to more generous exemptions 
(such as more than $1500 of vehicle equity exempted, total vehicle exempted, or multiple 
vehicles fully or partially exempted), car ownership increases from 45 percent to 55 
percent.  Vehicle ownership is also higher in states with the more lenient policy of 
valuing vehicles based on the equity value as compared to states that value vehicles at the 
fair market value (50 percent vs. 46 percent).  We see a similar pattern regarding limits 
on the total amount of assets allowable.  For those states with asset limits over $1000,   20
average car ownership is 51 percent relative to only 47 percent for states with an asset 
limit equaling $1000.  In addition, car ownership on average is higher in states that ever 
had a waiver in place (50 percent vs. 47 percent).  We observe analogous patterns for 
employment rates.  That is, employment tends to be higher in states with looser asset 
limits, greater auto exemptions, and waivers in place.   
These findings of higher auto ownership and higher employment in more lenient 
circumstances cannot be interpreted entirely as a causal effect of welfare reform due to 
the fact that there was a concurrent economic expansion over this time period.  While 
there was a trend toward loosening of asset limits and increasing vehicle exemptions over 
this period, the national unemployment rate fell from 6.1 percent in 1994 to 4.2 percent in 
1999 (Economic Report of the President, February 2004).  More specifically, the average 
unemployment rate was 5.4 percent for states with a $1500 vehicle limit and was only 4.3 
percent for those with vehicle exemptions.  Therefore, the trend towards increasing asset 
limits and vehicle exemptions coincides with a trend towards improving labor market 
condition.  Furthermore, in an analysis across states within years (not shown), we also 
find evidence that states with lower unemployment rates were more likely to have lenient 
asset tests in place.   
The descriptive analysis provides evidence of increased car ownership in states 
with looser asset limits and more generous vehicle exemptions.  However, given these 
simultaneous events (welfare reform and the economic expansion), it is important to 
control for both welfare reform and changing economic conditions at the state-level in 
addition to demographic and human capital characteristics for individuals.  Lastly, to 
control for potential spurious correlation between welfare reform and car ownership   21
among female household heads with children, we also look at the relationship between 
these variables for auto ownership among men without children and women without 
children. 
IV.  Empirical Results 
Determinants of Auto Ownership 
Table 4 presents the results of our models of the determinants of car ownership 
for female heads of household with children under 18 who do not have a college degree.  
In the first specification, we only include the state-level welfare rules.  In the second we 
add individual characteristics and in the third we add state unemployment rates and year 
dummy variables.
7  In the first specification, the signs of the coefficients on the welfare 
rules variables are all as expected:  Specifically, car ownership is lower in states that do 
not exempt the full value of the vehicle and owning a car is positively correlated with 1) 
the dollar amount of the vehicle exemption; 2) having a multiple vehicle exemption; 3) 
valuing the vehicle on an equity basis; 4) the size of the overall asset limit; and 5) 
whether there was a waiver in the state.  Nonetheless, only exempting multiple vehicles 
(all or part) and the size of the asset limit exert a significant effect on the probability of 
owning a car.   For individuals in states with multiple vehicles exempt from the asset test, 
auto ownership is 5 percentage points higher than for those in states that only consider 
exemptions on one vehicle.  In addition, our results in specification (1) also suggest that a 
$1000 increase in the overall countable asset limit leads to a 2.6 percentage point increase 
in car ownership for female heads of household without a college degree in that state. 
  In both specifications 2 and 3, the effects of multiple vehicle exemptions and the 
                                                 
7 We take into consideration the fact that the welfare rules vary across states but do not vary across 
individuals within states in our linear probability models.  To do this, we estimate a random effects model 
with a grouped error structure for states.   22
size of asset limit remain positive and significant on the probability of owning a car.  
Concerning the effects of other variables in our specifications, we find that blacks and 
Hispanic women are significantly less likely to own a car.  In addition, being in school 
and having children at home are also negatively correlated with car ownership.  Within 
our sample of women without college degrees, those with at least a high school degree 
are more likely to have a car and car ownership increases with age at a decreasing rate.  
Lastly, the unemployment rate in a state is negatively correlated with the probability of 
car ownership.  For every percentage point increase in the unemployment rate, the 
probability of car ownership falls by 2.4 percentage points. 
  In Table 5, we present the results that differentiate the effects of welfare reform 
on car ownership on our at-risk sample relative to a control group that is unlikely to be 
affected directly by the changes in welfare eligibility rules.  This control group contains 
male and female household heads without children.  In the specifications in Table 5, the 
coefficients on the interaction terms are the parameters of interest and tell us the effects 
of these welfare rules on female household heads with kids, above and beyond any 
correlation with the control group in the state.   
In these specifications, the coefficients on the interaction term for four of the six 
welfare rules are significant and positive.  In addition to multiple vehicle exemptions and 
the amount of the overall asset limit, evaluating a vehicle on an equity basis and having a 
waiver in the state are positively correlated with the probability of car ownership.  The 
magnitude of the effects of multiple vehicle exemptions and asset limit are similar to (but 
slightly less than) those in the linear probability model where the sample is restricted to 
women with kids (shown in Table 4).  For the equity valuation variable, in states that   23
value a vehicle based on equity rather than a fair market basis, the probability of car 
ownership is about 2 to 4 percentage points higher for single women with kids than for 
the control group.  In states that ever had a waiver in place, car ownership is 2 to 3 
percentage points higher.  Thus, this estimation strategy provides further evidence that we 
are truly picking up the effects of the changes in these welfare rules on the population 
considered most at risk of welfare recipiency. 
Determinants of Employment 
Turning to the effects of car ownership on employment outcomes, Table 6 
presents the results of our instrumental variables regression (the second stage results) 
along side of the results of the OLS linear probability model.  Beginning with the OLS 
results, controlling for individual characteristics and state-level economic conditions 
explains a sizable portion of the unadjusted differences in employment rates, hours and 
hourly wages between those with and without cars presented in Table 1.  Nonetheless, 
large differences remain.  For example, there is a 27 percentage point difference in the 
employment rate between those with cars and those without in the OLS regression 
compared to a 40 percentage point unadjusted difference.  For hours worked, the adjusted 
difference is 11 hours compared to unadjusted difference of 17 hours and wages are only 
$1.20 higher in the OLS model compared to a $2.60 difference in the raw means.  While 
the OLS models are able to control for individual, state-level, and time effects, they do 
not indicate causality, only a positive association between car ownership and labor 
market outcomes. 
In order to address the potential endogeneity of car ownership and to assess 
whether the results found the OLS regressions are causal, we instrument car ownership   24
with state-level welfare rules and present the second stage results in Table 6.  The F-
statistic for the test of the joint significance of the five instruments is quite large (18.69) 
and is significant at the 0.002 level for specification (3) in Table 4.  Therefore, even after 
controlling for individual characteristics, state-level economic conditions, and an overall 
time trend in the data (through year dummy variables), the instruments are strongly 
correlated with the probability of owning a car. 
The 2SLS results indicate a positive and significant effect of car ownership on the 
probability of being employed.  Although the 2SLS estimate (of .51) is higher than the 
OLS estimate (of .27), the standard error for the 2SLS coefficient is large and suggests 
that this coefficient is estimated with less precision than the OLS estimate.
8  Nonetheless, 
we are able to measure a significant positive employment effect suggesting evidence of a 
causal role of car ownership on being employed for a population with a high risk of 
receiving welfare.  The 2SLS results for hours also suggest a significant positive effect of 
car ownership, while the 2SLS results for wages are negative and not significant.   
V.  Conclusion 
We find evidence that state-level welfare rules regarding asset limits and 
exemptions for vehicle values are jointly statistically significant for predicting vehicle 
ownership for less educated female household heads with children.  Of the six individual 
welfare rules that we investigated, the asset limit itself was highly significant in all 
specifications and our results suggest that raising the asset limit by $1,000 is associated 
with a 2 percentage point gain in the vehicle ownership rate for states adopting these 
looser asset limits.  In addition, allowing for multiple vehicles to be exempt raises the 
                                                 
8 In the future, we plan to test whether these coefficients are statistically significantly different from each 
other.  In addition, we have not yet implemented random effects into the two stage least squares portion of 
the analysis and the standard errors may be even larger after this correction is made.   25
probability of vehicle ownership by somewhere between 2 to 3 percentage points.
9  In a 
regression which compares female householders with children against a control group 
that is unlikely to be affected by welfare rules, two additional variables come in 
statistically significant:  the dummy indicating whether a vehicle’s value is assessed on 
an equity basis and a dummy indicating whether the state ever had a waiver from the 
federal welfare rules during the 5-year time period. 
In a two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression using the asset value limit and 
vehicle exemption rules as instruments, we find evidence that car ownership has a 
positive and statistically significant effect on the probability of being employed and on 
hours worked, but has no statistically significant effect on wages.  As compared to OLS 
regressions, the coefficients on employment status and hours worked are higher in the 
2SLS specification.   
The findings strongly suggest that welfare rules, particularly the asset limit, have 
a discernible impact on vehicle ownership.  In addition, our preliminary 2SLS results 
further suggest that this impact on vehicle ownership then translates into higher levels of 
employment and more hours of work.   
 
                                                 
9 When we limit the sample to female household heads with children, this result was significant at 
the 10% level, but when we allow for a comparison against a control group that is unlikely to be affected 
directly by welfare rules, the difference from the control group is significant at the 5% level.   
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Table 1 
Means of Employment, Work Hours, and Hourly Wages by Car Ownership Status: 
Female Heads of Household with Children and without a College Degree   
(1994-1999) 

















































1326.16      
(14.341) 
























N 14903  7310  7593   
Note:  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Source:  authors’ calculations from the Survey of Income and Program Participation 




State-level welfare rules affecting auto-ownership 
(1994-1999) 
 




























1994 $1551.02  0%  0%  100%  27%  $1102.04 
1995 $1739.58  2%  2%  98%  45%  $1224.49 
1996 $2414.20  8%  8%  96%  55%  $1367.35 
1997  $4891.00  41% 27% 82% 25%  $1895.83 
1998  $6147.82  45% 33% 76% 12%  $2322.92 
1999  $6512.64  49% 37% 73% 10%  $2416.67 
 
a.  Applies when states indicated a dollar value of a vehicle that does not count towards asset limits. 
b.  Note:  the number of states only adds up to 49 because Maine & Vermont and North & South Dakota are combined to merge with the SIPP data.  Washington, DC is also 
included 
c.  Dummy variable equal to one if  all or part of multiple vehicles are exempted. 
d.  Dummy variable equal to one if the vehicle is valued on an equity basis and zero if based on fair market value.  Equity value of a car equals the fair market value minus 
the amount still owed on the car. 
e.  Dummy variable equal to one if a state has any welfare rules in place authorized under a waiver. 
f.  Indicates the unrestricted asset/resource limit.  Maximum amount of assets that may be held by an AFDC/TANF applicant unit, by state as of July 1. 
Sources:  For 1996-1999, Urban Institute Welfare Rules Database.  For 1994 and 1995, unpublished auto asset rules from the Urban Institute and asset limits from the Urban 
Institute’s TRIM3 microsimulation model.  29
 
Table 3 
Means of Demographic and Background Characteristics: 
Female Heads of Household with Children and without a College Degree   
Stratified by Auto Asset Exemptions (1994-1999) 
Eligibility 
Status 
All   $1500 of 
Vehicle 
Exempt 
































































































































 4.22  
(0.046) 
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(0.078) 






































  865.05  
  (10.21)
























































N  14903 4659 6404 3582 2801 12277 2626 6791 8112 3946 10957
Note:  Standard errors are in parentheses.  * indicates “for those employed”.  30
 
Table 3 – Continued 
Means of Demographic and Background Characteristics: 
Female Heads of Household with Children and without a College Degree 
Stratified by Auto Asset Exemptions (1994-1999) 
Eligibilit
y Status 
All   $1500 of 
Vehicle 
Exempt 























































































































































































N  14903 4659 6404 3582 2801 12277 2626 6791 8112 3946 10957
Note:  Standard errors are in parentheses.  * indicates “for those employed”.Table 4 
Regressions of Car Ownership on State-Level Welfare Rules and Demographic 
Characteristics:  Female Heads of Household with Children under 18 and without a 





























































































   -0.024*** 
(0.008) 










R^2 .007  .258  .266 
N 14903  14903  14903 
a:  indicates that states had a limit to the amount of the vehicle exemption in place.  Note:  All regressions include a constant and all 
models include random state effects.  * indicates significance at the 10% level. ** indicates significance at the 5% level.*** indicates 
significance at the 1% level.  Standard errors are in parentheses.a.  The F-statistics are from tests of the collective significance of the 
instruments (the first five welfare rules) for the employment, hours, and wage regressions (see table 6).  32
 
Table 5 
Regressions of Car Ownership on State-Level Welfare Rules and Demographic 
Characteristics:  Female Heads of Household with Children and Female and Male 
Heads of Household without Children (1994-1999)  











































































































R^2 0.038  0.175  0.179 
N 43068  43068  43068 
Note:  All regressions include a constant and all models include random state effects.  * indicates significance at the 
10% level. ** indicates significance at the 5% level.*** indicates significance at the 1% level.  Standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
a.  The F-statistics are from tests of the collective significance of the instruments (the first five welfare rules) for the 
employment, hours, and wage regressions (see table 6).  33
 
Table 6 
OLS and 2SLS Estimates of the Effect of Car Ownership on Employment, Work 
Hours and Wages:  Female Heads of Household with Children and without a College 
Degree (1994-1999) 
 Employed  Hours Wages 







11.135***   
(0.307) 










0.570*      
(0.293) 









































































































Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R^2  .242 .190 .287 .238 .144 .132 
N  14902 14902 14902 14902  9143  9143 
Note:  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Instruments:  Vehicle limit, $ amount of limit, multiple vehicles considered, equity valuation used.  
Not instruments:  Waiver ever.   34
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